Book Review by Fritsch, Olaf
Journal of Air Law and Commerce




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air
Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Olaf Fritsch, Book Review, 51 J. Air L. & Com. 267 (1985)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol51/iss1/8
BOOK REVEIW
AIR CRASH INVESTIGATION OF GENERAL AVIA-
TION AIRCRAFT BY GLENN ELLIS, WITH CONTRIBUTIONS
FROM C.O. MILLER AND J.M. RAMSDEN. GREYBULL, WYO-
MING: CAPSTAN PUBLICATIONS INC., 1984, PP. 239.
A recent article in Harper's Magazine listed 76 "how
to" book titles, culled from the Denver public library,
which included "You can be a carpenter, .... You can be a
printer," and "You can learn to fly." However, to the re-
lief of those accident investigators who read the article,
the title "You can investigate an aircraft accident," could
not be found. Investigators should be relieved because
no one can learn how to investigate aircraft accidents by
simply reading a book. However, a book can provide
some understanding of the accident investigation
processes and the problems that confront an investigator.
This book by Glenn Ellis does exactly that, and more. In
the book, the general aviation pilot is provided with some
well-chosen safety lessons; the lawyer can find a well-writ-
ten chapter on legal implications of aircraft investigations;
the sometimes frustrated accident investigator can find
some well put recommendations regarding the manage-
ment and practices of federal accident investigations; and
the airline passenger can find the mysteries of financial
liability briefly, but clearly, explained.
Accident investigation is the least desirable form of ac-
cident prevention. Ideally, the hazards or deficiencies, re-
vealed in an accident investigation as causes, should have
been eliminated or avoided before the accident occurred.
However, once an accident does happen it is essential that
all causes of the accident be established and that recom-
mendations be made to eliminate or avoid the deficiencies
which contributed to the accident.
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The investigation of aircraft accidents is similar to most
other investigations: gathering facts, analyzing those facts,
drawing conclusions and making recommendations. That
sounds simple enough in theory. In practice, however,
the investigator standing next to a smoking hole in the
ground sometimes thinks: "What should I do next?",
"What does this piece of evidence mean?" and "I wish
someone would chase away that reporter." This may be
particularly true in general aviation accidents which some-
times are investigated by only one person.
In the preface to his book, Ellis provides the reader with
general aviation injury statistics: during the decade of the
1970s there were 14,000 fatalities, 30,000 serious injuries,
7,000 aircraft destroyed and 45,000 aircraft damaged. El-
lis contends that the majority of general aviation accidents
are inadequately investigated. Many investigators in
North America agree with this conclusion. For example, a
paper by Professor "Skee" Parker of the University of
Southern California raises the question of whether gen-
eral aviation accident investigations prevent accidents.
The paper concludes that because certain accidents, such
as those related to weather, are repeated, accident investi-
gations must not prevent accidents.
In the first of the book's eight chapters, Ellis sets the
stage for what follows by describing in some detail an in-
flight breakup. In the following chapters he describes the
initial action at the crash site; the "paper chase" or inves-
tigation of crew, aircraft and Air Traffic Controller docu-
mentation; and witness interviews. The book also
discusses considerations regarding inaccessible wreckage;
wreckage'analysis (such as structural failures, fatigue, fire,
engine and system analysis, aircraft performance and
flight instruments); and analysis and determination of ac-
cident causes. The last two chapters address financial lia-
bility (by J.M. Ramsden of Flight International) and legal
implications (by C.O. Miller of System Safety, Inc.) of air-
craft investigations.
The chapters discussing witness interviews and engi-
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neering and maintenance considerations of an investiga-
tor are particularly useful and practical. The book
devotes considerable attention to those engine failures re-
lated to fuel exhaustion and contamination. This is a
partcularly fertile field because twenty percent of all en-
gine failures relate to these factors.
The chapter on financial liability, prompted by the DC-
10 accident near Paris in 1974, is brief and to the point. It
recommends,inter alia, that the Warsaw theory of pre-
sumed airline liability in exchange for limited liability be
recognized as a sound principle. The author further rec-
ommends that the presumed liability should, as in the
case of nuclear power stations, be attributed primarily to
the operator, who may later have recourse against his sup-
plier or another party.
A chapter on legal implications of accident investiga-
tions briefly traces the legislative history of aviation safety
in the United States, including the various organizations
and laws involved. This survey precedes a detailed scru-
tiny of the current rules and procedures of the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the internal
practices of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), as
they apply to accident investigation.
The problems inherent in the term "probable cause" as
used by the NTSB are discussed at length. First, because
the NTSB uses this expression in the singular and practi-
cally all accidents have more than one cause, use of terms
like "contributing causes" becomes necessary. The cause
selected for the label of "probable cause" is thus given
the highest status and will, in the mind of the reader, be-
come the most important (or "primary") cause. That
cause becomes the focus for safety recommendations
while other causes may not receive the scrutiny they de-
serve. The deliberations surrounding selection of the
"probable" cause from all actual causes of an accident
have been known to develop into a task of major propor-
tions. Much time and money are spent in making this se-
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lection, sometimes with detrimental effect to the ultimate
objective of preventing accidents.
Secondly, the term "probable cause" has a specific
meaning in the legal context ("an apparent state of facts
to exist upon reasonable inquiry. . . which would induce
a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe, in a
criminal case, that the accused person had committed the
crime charged..."). To the accident investigator it
means something else, usually something like "events,
conditions or circumstances which could induce an acci-
dent." This latter definition is confusingly similar to the
legal definition of "proximate cause." For these and
other reasons, Miller recommends that an "all cause"
concept be introduced by the NTSB. Such a system is
currently used by the United States Air Force and was first
introduced by the Royal Canadian Air Force in the 1960s.
With the "all cause" concept, all causes would be listed in
the accident report, usually in chronological order, and
examined for possible preventive action.
In the remaining chapters of the book many other as-
pects of FAA-NTSB practices are discussed, such as "In-
ternational Considerations; Cause versus Fault; Problems
during the Investigative Process; Availability and Use of
Information Derived during NTSB Investigations; and
Scope, Depth and Accuracy of Investigations." The final
chapter includes several recommendations regarding
NTSB management and practices.
This is a good book which could have been better if the
editor had paid more attention to using correct terminol-
ogy. Given the title of the book, the reader is sometimes
taken by surprise. For instance, very few general aviation
aircraft have afterburners or LOX systems, although both
features are discussed. Sometimes unusual terminology
slips into the text such as Vertical Velocity Indicator to
refer to a Vertical Speed Indicator.
From the pure accident investigation point of view, the
analysis of the in-flight break-up in chapter one proves
puzzling. The author's discussion of wreckage trajectory
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is unusual. Normally, the parts of an aircraft with the
greatest density, such as engine, or batteries, etc., will
travel the farthest. The parts of lesser density, such as the
tail, ailerons, or rudder, will travel a shorter distance.
The break-up discussed in the book did not occur in this
fashion. The author should have explained the circum-
stances which led to the engine and cabin travelling the
shortest distance and the rudder the farthest (perhaps a
nearly vertical dive angle and a very strong tail wind?).
From an overall perspective, the author accomplished
what he set out to do, and he has been especially success-
ful with respect to his discussion of the engineering and
maintenance aspects of aircraft investigation. I do not
hesitate in recommending this book to anyone with an in-
terest in general aviation accident investigation.
Olof Fritsch *
* Chief of Accident Investigation and Prevention Section, International Civil
Aviation Organization ("ICAO"). The opinions expressed by 0. Fritsch are en-
tirely his own and do not represent ICAO policy.
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